fix: add explicit length check for Symbol (Closes #1564)#1663
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Baskarayelu merged 6 commits intoJun 27, 2026
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Threat Model: Prevents potential resource exhaustion by rejecting symbols > 9 chars before instantiation. Cost: Verified via env.cost_estimate().
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add explicit length check for Symbol (Closes #1564) — clean work, in it goes 🚀 |
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#Closes #1564
Summary
Added an explicit length check to the
set_symbolfunction to reject symbols exceeding 9 characters. This is a defense-in-depth measure to prevent potential issues before theSymbol::new()instantiation.Threat Model
If this check is missing, an attacker could potentially supply an oversized string, which might lead to resource exhaustion during contract execution. Validating this at the contract entry point ensures we reject invalid inputs early, saving compute costs and preventing unexpected behavior.
Performance Impact
The overhead of this check is negligible. Verified confirming it remains well within the gas limits for this transaction path.
Verification
src/test.rsto verify rejection of symbols > 9 characters.#closes